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In this work we analyze the evolution of voluntary vaccination in networked populations by entangling
the spreading dynamics of an influenza-like disease with an evolutionary framework taking place at the end
of each influenza season so that individuals take or do not take the vaccine upon their previous experience.
Our framework thus puts in competition two well-known dynamical properties of scale-free networks: the fast
propagation of diseases and the promotion of cooperative behaviors. Our results show that when vaccine is
perfect, scale-free networks enhance the vaccination behavior with respect to random graphs with homogeneous
connectivity patterns. However, when imperfection appears we find a crossover effect so that the number of
infected (vaccinated) individuals increases (decreases) with respect to homogeneous networks, thus showing the
competition between the aforementioned properties of scale-free graphs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of network science [1,2] has provided an
important set of computational and statistical physics tools
for describing the problem of epidemic spreading by incor-
porating the realistic interaction patterns of the constituents
of social and technological systems [3]. Classical approaches
to epidemiology [4,5] rely on the use of the theory of phase
transitions and critical phenomena, so as to unveil the onset and
the macroscopic impact of epidemic outbreaks. Recently these
techniques have been pervasively adapted to study a variety of
critical phenomena on top of networks [6].
The main contribution of the former line of research to
epidemiology has been the development of a generalized
mean-field framework in which general patterns of interactions
can be included. In particular, it was shown [7–12] that
for scale-free networks [in which the probability distribution
of having a node with k neighbors follows a power law,
P (k) ∼ k−α] the epidemic onset was anticipated as compared
to substrates with more regular (or homogeneous) connectivity
patterns. Moreover, when α < 3 (as most of social and
technological networks show [13,14]) and for large enough
(thermodynamic limit) systems, the epidemic onset vanishes,
meaning that even a very small fraction of infected elements
with small infective power can spread a disease to a macro-
scopic part of the population by a sequence of contagions
between neighbors of the network, as happens in human
contacts [15–18].
Apart from the theoretical value of the above finding, its
direct implications on public health campaigns and the security
of technological networks such as the Internet demand a deeper
understanding about the influence that diverse contact patterns
have on disease dynamics, its co-evolution [19,20], and the
design of new algorithms for immunization and vaccination
policies. Typically, these studies aim at identifying the most
efficient way for reducing the impact of an epidemic by the
vaccination or immunization of the minimal number of nodes.
To this aim, different methods to identify the most important
nodes to be immunized have been proposed [21–24].
The former works concern the immunization of tech-
nological networks since in social contexts vaccination is
typically voluntary. Thus, the study of the immunization of
a population demands that we include the ways vaccination
and risky behaviors compete and spread across individuals.
To this aim, one may consider game theory to formulate a
social dilemma in terms of the benefits associated to each
of the behaviors: vaccination or not. Within this framework
individuals act rationally, i.e., by choosing their strategy after
an evaluation of their potential benefits. This evaluation is
done by considering their perception of the risk to con-
tract the disease. For well-mixed populations recent results
show [25–30] that voluntary vaccination is not efficient to
reach efficient immunization. However, this kind of approach
was generalized to networks [31], unveiling an enhancement
of voluntary vaccination.
The former game theoretical approach considers that agents
aim at maximizing their own benefits. However, the decisions
of individuals can evolve in time depending on the epidemic
incidence observed in the population. In this framework agents
are prone to adopt the strategies that are expected to perform
better based on the information available. This evolutionary
avenue has been recently adopted to the vaccination dilemma.
A first evolutionary avenue is presented in Refs. [32–34]
where both disease transmission and vaccinating behavior
evolve in time simultaneously. The evolution for the fraction
of vaccinated individuals is driven by the difference of payoffs
between vaccinated and nonvaccinated agents (as in the
case of the well-known replicator equation of evolutionary
games [35,36]), with the latter determined by the epidemic
incidence at that time. A second evolutionary approach is
proposed in Ref. [37]. In this case, inspired by seasonal
influenza, the number of vaccinated individuals remains
constant during the duration of the influenza season. After
each season, individuals evaluate the payoffs based on the
incidence of the disease in the last season and decide whether
to vaccinate or not for the next seasons.
Here we take a similar avenue to that of Ref. [37] regarding
the dynamical setup and the motivation: the vaccination for
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seasonal influenza. However, the way in which payoffs are
constructed and the way individuals choose their strategy
follow the typical setup of evolutionary games [35,36].
This setup, originally presented in Ref. [38] for the vac-
cination dilemma, considers that individuals are assigned
a payoff that is solely based on the personal experience
during the last season. In addition, the strategic choice
is based on the imitation of those individuals with better
payoffs. Thus, we do not consider that individuals follow
a rational derivation of the payoffs associated to vaccina-
tion and risky behavior based on the information available.
This allow us to connect the vaccination dilemma with
other studies on the evolutionary game dynamics of social
dilemmas [35,36].
In recent years, the study of the evolutionary
game dynamics of social dilemmas on structured popu-
lations [39–41] has shown that cooperation (here related
to vaccination) is favored when the interactions among
individuals take the form of scale-free networks [42,43].
Inspired by this result, in this work we explore the spread of
vaccination behavior across networks with homogeneous and
heterogeneous (scale-free) connectivity patterns. Our results
show that when vaccine is perfect, scale-free networks enhance
the vaccination behavior with respect to homogeneous graphs,
thus reducing the impact of the disease on the population. How-
ever, when vaccine is imperfect, we find a crossover effect, and
homogeneous networks outperform scale-free ones. This latter
scenario reveals an interesting competition between the rapid
spread of both diseases and cooperative behaviors in scale-free
graphs.
II. THE MODEL
As introduced above, to incorporate the competition be-
tween disease spreading and evolutionary dynamics on top
of a network we entangle these two dynamical frameworks
by producing an iterative sequence of a two-stage process.
In both stages the interaction pattern among individuals is
described by a complex network (keeping the same network for
both dynamical setups). This network is given by an (N × N )
adjacency matrix Aij so that when two individuals interact
Aij = 1, whereas Aij = 0 otherwise. In this way, the number
ki of neighbors (contacts) of a given node, say, i, is given by
ki =
∑N
j=1 Aij .
In this work we will consider two of the most paradigmatic
network models: Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) graphs [44] and Baraba´si-
Albert (BA) networks [45]. The former class of graphs are
described by a Poisson degree distribution P (k), so that most
of the nodes have a connectivity close to the mean value
〈k〉. On the other hand, BA networks display a power-law
degree distribution of the form,P (k) ∼ k−3, thus incorporating
the scale-free (SF) property of real-world networks. The
implementation of our dynamical setup aims at revealing
the differences between the heterogeneous degree pattern
displayed in SF and the rather homogeneous structure of ER
graphs. To this aim, for both ER and SF networks, the average
connectivity of the nodes is set to 〈k〉 = 6. Below we introduce
the rules governing the two-stage dynamics, also sketched in
Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. (Color online) Resuming sequence of the evolutionary
picture of our model. The top box describes the epidemic spreading
process. The bottom one displays the payoffs accumulated by the
agents according to their strategy. Arrows denote the causal order of
the evolutionary process.
A. Disease spreading
The first of the stages of our dynamical setup is based on the
evolution of a susceptible-exposed-infected-recovered (SEIR)
model [4,5]. This model captures the dynamics of influenza-
type infections. Susceptible nodes have not been infected and
are healthy. They catch the disease via direct contact with
exposed neighbors at a rate λ. Exposed nodes are supposed
to carry the virus although they still do not display symptoms
of the disease; thus these individuals are highly infectious
during this incubation period. Exposed nodes become infected
with some rate μ′ which typically is the inverse time of the
incubation period of the disease. Infected nodes, on the other
hand, although still carrying the virus are here assumed not to
be infectious. In particular, we consider that during this period
they remain isolated from the rest of the population. Finally,
infected nodes pass to the recovered state with rate μ that is
the inverse duration time of the convalescence period.
With the above rules we consider that each node i interacts
simultaneously with its ki neighbors per unit time. Thus, for
a network described by the adjacency matrix Aij the effective
probability that a susceptible node i gets the disease per unit
time is given by
P iS→E = 1 − (1 − λ)
∑N
j=1 Aij xj , (1)
where xj = 1 when node j is exposed and xj = 0 otherwise.
Here, in order to mimic the transmission of ordinary influenza,
we have set μ′ = 0.33, since the time elapsed between
exposure to the virus and development of symptoms is two
to three days. In addition we take μ = 0.2 since the symptoms
of uncomplicated influenza illness resolve after a period of 3
to 7 days, so that the average permanence in the infected state
is μ−1 = 5 days.
The addition of vaccinated individuals to the formulation
of our SEIR model implies that initially there is subset of
susceptible individuals (representing a fraction NV of the
total population) that are less prone to catch the disease than
nonvaccinated susceptible ones. In particular, we consider that
a vaccinated individual is infected during a single contact with
an exposed one at a rate λ γ , where γ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter
that modulates the quality of the vaccine, being perfect when
γ = 0 and useless for γ = 1. In this way, the probability that
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a vaccinated individual i is infected per unit time reads
P iS→E = 1 − (1 − γ λ)
∑N
j=1 Aij xj . (2)
Once the values of the epidemic parameters μ and μ′, the
quality γ of the vaccine, and the fraction NV of vaccinated
individuals are set, we leave λ as the relevant control parameter
of the SEIR model. In addition, the relevant order parameter of
the dynamics is the fraction R of nodes that got infected once
the epidemic process dies out, so that the macroscopic behavior
is captured by the curve R(λ). For a given value of λ one starts
from an initial state in which a small fraction (here 5%) of
the population is set as exposed. Then the SEIR dynamics
is iterated until no individuals remain either as exposed or
infected.
B. Evolutionary dynamics
Once the SEIR dynamics dies out we consider that the
seasonal influenza period has passed. Before the next SEIR
dynamics starts, individuals evaluate whether to vaccinate or
not for the next season. At this point evolutionary dynamics
takes place by assigning to each of the individuals a payoff πi
(i = 1, . . . ,N ) that depends on their experience accumulated
during the last SEIR propagation. As shown in Fig. 1, there
are four possibilities:
(1) Vaccinated individuals that remain healthy during the
last season have payoff π = −c (where c is a cost associated
to the vaccine).
(2) Vaccinated individuals that were infected during the last
season have payoff π = −c − TI (where TI is the time units
that the individual remain in the infected state).
(3) Individuals that did not vaccinated and remain healthy
during the season have payoff π = 0.
(4) Nonvaccinated individuals that were infected are as-
signed a payoff π = −TI .
The cost c associated to the vaccination is related to
different issues such as the time spent to get vaccinated (via
Public Health Services) or the probability that the vaccine
causes side effects. To illustrate the vaccination dilemma let
us show a very simple situation of a susceptible agent i in
contact with an exposed agent. In this situation the expected
payoff of i when having taken the vaccine is π expV = −(1 −
γ λ)c − γ λ(c + 1/μ) (here we assume that TI  1/μ). On the
other hand, if agent i has adopted a risky behavior, its expected
payoff turns into π expNV = −λ/μ. Thus, in this single pairwise
encounter, the rational choice is not to take the vaccine for any
costs c > λ(1 − γ )/μ. This simple situation clearly reveals the
Vaccination Dilemma. However, in a networked population the
situation is rather more complex, and, more importantly, here
we assume that individuals are not fully rational and, instead
of deciding their behavior on expectations, they evolve their
strategies based on their previous experience.
Evolutionary dynamics provides the framework to imple-
ment the dynamical evolution of strategies. In particular, as is
usually done in evolutionary social dilemmas on networks,
each individual, say, i, chooses at random one of its first
neighbors, say, j , and compares their payoffs πi and πj
respectively. Then the probability that agent i takes the strategy
of j , sj , for the next season increases with their payoff
difference, (πj − πi). One of the most used frameworks to
calculate this probability is that of the Fermi-like rule [46,47],
in which the probability that the strategy of the neighbor j is
adopted by i reads
Psj→si =
1
1 + exp[−β(πj − πi)] , (3)
where β is a parameter that allows us to span between random
(β 	 1) and strong selection (β 
 1). Here we adopted β = 1
and checked that our results are quite robust under changes of
β. The update of strategies takes place simultaneously for all
the agents. Once the new strategies are taken, the payoffs are
set to zero, and the SEIR dynamics starts again with a new
fraction NV of vaccinated susceptible individuals.
Finally, let us note that we iterate the sequence of the two-
stage process (SEIR dynamics and evolutionary dynamics)
for a number of steps (generations) large enough to reach a
steady state for the relevant observables: the average fraction of
recovered, 〈R〉, and vaccinated individuals, 〈NV 〉. In addition,
at the beginning of each generation we randomly assign the in-
dividuals that are vaccinated (so that they constitute 25% of the
population) and those that are initially set as exposed (reaching
5% of the total population). It is worth mentioning that in
real cases a small fraction of the population gain permanent
immunity from exposure to the virus in the last generation. In
our case we do not consider such inherited immunity to the new
strain.
III. RESULTS
We start our discussion by briefly reporting the behavior
of the SEIR model without vaccinated individuals. In the top
panel of Fig. 2 we show the average fraction 〈R〉 of recovered
individuals at the end of the SEIR dynamics as a function of
the rate of infection per contact, λ, for ER and SF networks of
N = 1000. From this figure it becomes clear that SF networks
accelerates the onset λc of the epidemic regime as compared
to ER graphs.
Let us now focus on the case of SF networks to evaluate
the impact that voluntary vaccination (under an evolutionary
framework) has on the immunization of the system. In
the bottom panel of Fig. 2 we show the evolution of the
FIG. 2. (Color online) The top panel shows the epidemic diagram
〈R〉(λ) for ER and SF networks when vaccination is not allowed.
The bottom panel shows the evolution of the fraction of recovered
individuals, R, with the generations of the evolutionary dynamics.
The network is SF, and the rate of infection per contact is λ = 0.35,
whereas vaccination is perfect γ = 0 and it has a cost c = 0.1.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The contour plots show the average fraction of recovered 〈R〉 (top) and vaccinated 〈NV 〉 (bottom) individuals as a
function of the infection rate λ and the vaccine quality γ for SF networks. From left to right the panels correspond to different vaccination
costs: c = 0.1 [panels (a) and (d)], c = 0.5 [panels (b) and (e)], and c = 1.0 [panels (c) and (f)]. As the cost increases we note that the overall
fraction of vaccinated individuals decreases while that of recovered nodes increases. Interestingly when c = 0.1 there is a range of low γ values
(γ < 0.1) for which the epidemic threshold disappears and the disease cannot spread for any value of λ.
fraction of recovered individuals R for a sequence of 2000
generations. The rate of infection used in this simulation
is set to λ = 0.35, which, as the top panel shows, corre-
sponds to a situation in which almost all the population
has been infected 〈R〉  1 when no vaccination is allowed.
Instead, when individuals can decide whether to take the
vaccination (under the aforementioned evolutionary rules)
we show that the epidemic phase does not appear (R  0)
since the population has evolutionarily adopted the vaccination
strategy.
Remarkably, the transient regime (lasting around 500
generations) shows an interesting pattern of rise and falls for
the number of recovered individuals R. This behavior points
out that, before vaccination prevails, the population displays an
oscillating behavior between vaccination and risky behavior.
Obviously, when many people vaccinate (falls in R) the
epidemic falls, but vaccinated individuals are tempted not to
take the vaccine due to the higher benefits of risky individuals.
This leads to a progressive increase of the infections (denoted
by the increase of R) that reverse the balance of benefits
between risky and vaccinated individuals. This rise-and-fall
behavior together with the significant duration of this transient
regime reveal the importance of risk perception in voluntary
vaccination.
A. Macroscopic behavior of vaccine taking in SF networks
Now we analyze the behavior after the transient regime. To
this aim we compute the average fraction of vaccinated 〈NV 〉
and recovered 〈R〉 individual in the steady state as a function
of λ and the quality γ of the vaccine. For each couple of values
(λ, γ ) we have run 100 simulations (each of them comprising
2000 generations). In Fig. 3 we report these functions for
several vaccine costs c in SF networks. In particular, the panels
in the top show the diagrams 〈R〉(λ,γ ) and those in the bottom
show 〈NV 〉(λ,γ ). From left to right the panels correspond to
the following vaccine costs: c = 0.1, 0.5, and 1.0.
Let us focus on those diagrams corresponding to c = 0.1
[panels (a) and (d)]. The function R(λ,γ ) shows that for values
of γ ∈ [0,0.1] (roughly perfect vaccination) the epidemic
threshold disappears since 〈R〉  0 for all the values of λ.
In its turn, we note from panel (d) that for this latter region
the fraction of vaccinated individuals is roughly 〈NV 〉  1
except for very low values of λ for which the disease cannot
spread even when no immunization is present. If we increase
further the value of γ we recover the epidemic onset λc whose
values decrease as the vaccine get worse, i.e., as γ increases.
In addition, the vaccination behavior decreases so that for a
given value of γ the advantage provided by vaccines is not
useful anymore for λ > λc. Obviously, for γ = 1 we recover
the usual diagram R(λ), shown in the top panel of Fig. 1, for
SF networks since the vaccine provides no advantage, and,
as shown in panel (d), almost no individual in the network
holds the vaccination strategy giving 〈NV 〉  0 for all λ
values.
As we increase the cost of the vaccine to c = 0.5 [panels
(b) and (e)] and c = 1.0 [panels (c) and (f)] we observe that the
overall fraction of recovered (vaccinated) individuals increases
(decreases). Remarkably, the maximum value of γ for which
there is no epidemic threshold decreases with c, and for c = 1.0
we cannot appreciate this effect. It is interesting to note that the
usual epidemic diagram of SF networks without immunization
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is recovered for lower values of γ . For instance, in panel (b) we
note that for γ > 0.6 the curve R(λ) does not change, whereas
from panel (e) we note that, within this region, individuals do
not vaccinate anymore (〈NV 〉 = 0).
B. SF versus ER networks: The importance of vaccine quality
Having reported the macroscopic behavior in SF networks
as concerns the influence of the vaccine quality and its cost,
we now focus on the dependence on the networked substrate in
which both the disease and the vaccination strategies spread.
To this aim, we compare the behavior in SF and ER networks
in order to measure the role of degree heterogeneity on the
vaccination behavior. Importantly, we have considered SF
networks as obtained from the Baraba´si-Albert model [45]
after a complete randomization preserving the degree sequence
of the nodes. In this way, we obtain SF networks with
P (k) ∼ k−3 without any kind of degree-degree correlations
that could influence the dynamical behavior. In addition, we
have increased the size of the networks considered (in order
to fully exploit the heterogeneous property of SF networks) to
N = 104 nodes.
We first explore the case of perfect vaccination, γ = 0.
In Fig. 4 we show the diagrams 〈R〉(λ) (top) and 〈NV 〉(λ)
(bottom) for two different vaccination costs: c = 0.5 [panels
(a) and (c)] and c = 1.0 [panels (b) and (d)]. In these panels
we also show the standard deviations around the average
values reported. From the panels we observe that SF networks
outperform ER graphs since the overall average number of
recovered (vaccinated) individuals is smaller (higher) in SF
networks. In particular, the epidemic diagrams 〈R〉(λ) display a
clear peak around the respective epidemic thresholds, λc, of the
original (without vaccination) graphs. Up to this point λ < λc,
the epidemic does not spread, and thus vaccination behavior
is not observed either as shown in the diagrams 〈NV 〉(λ). The
peak thus points out that the risk is so small that vaccination
behavior does not show up, leading to a burst of infections,
which reaches higher values in ER graphs. This result seems
counterintuitive, since from the literature on epidemics on
networks, SF graphs are always more prone to the spread
of diseases than ER ones. Furthermore, from the diagrams
〈NV 〉(λ) we note that the vaccination onset starts earlier for SF
graphs, as their natural epidemic threshold is smaller than that
of ER ones.
For values of λ above the natural epidemic threshold, the
number of recovered nodes decreases dramatically in both
networks. Here the risk of infection becomes larger, and
individuals start to adopt the vaccination strategy as diagrams
〈NV 〉(λ) in panels (c) and (d) show. However, vaccination
behavior spreads more easily in SF networks than in ER
graphs, and it is quite remarkable that, for this regime, the
number of recovered nodes in ER graphs is always (for any
value of λ) higher than in SF networks. Thus cooperative
behavior, by taking the vaccine, spreads better in SF networks,
in agreement with those studies about cooperation and social
dilemmas in complex networks [42,43].
In Fig. 5 we explore the scenario of imperfect vaccination
considering γ = 0.12. This regime shows the competition be-
tween two well-known effects: the aforementioned prevalence
of cooperative behaviors in SF networks (with respect to ER
FIG. 4. (Color online) Epidemic 〈R〉(λ) (top panels) and vacci-
nation 〈NV 〉(λ) (bottom panels) diagrams for ER and SF networks
(N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6) when the vaccine is perfect (γ = 0). The cost
associated to the vaccine are c = 0.5 (left panels) and c = 1.0 (right
panels).
graphs) and their weakness to the spread of diseases (again
with respect to ER graphs). This competition appears as a
crossover between the behavior of both 〈R〉(λ) and 〈NV 〉(λ)
in SF and ER networks. In panels (a) and (b) we show that
the curves 〈R〉(λ) (after the peak close to the natural epidemic
thresholds of both networks) cross at some λ∗ values, which
decreases with the cost of the vaccine c. Panels (c) and (d) show
also a crossover behavior for 〈NV 〉(λ), which appears with
some delay with respect to that occurring at λ∗ for 〈R〉(λ). Note
that this crossover is well defined since the standard deviations
around the average values 〈R〉 and 〈NV 〉 are extremely low.
The behavior for λ < λ∗ shows the same trend as for the
perfect vaccination case. SF networks outperform ER graphs
showing a larger number of vaccinated individuals and a
smaller number of infections. However, for the imperfect
vaccine (γ > 0) the growth of λ affects both nonvaccinated and
vaccinated individuals. Under such conditions, the virus finds
in the SF networks a better backbone to propagate. In this way,
panels (a) and (b) show that the failure of vaccination starts
to become evident in SF networks at λ∗. The smaller benefits
provided by the imperfection of the vaccine cause the number
of vaccinated individuals to start to decrease after λ∗. Being
larger the number of infections due to the imperfect vaccine
in SF networks, as shown for λ > λ∗, the fall of vaccinated
individuals occurs in SF networks at smaller values of λ than
in ER graphs, giving rise to the crossover for 〈NV 〉 shown in
panels (c) and (d).
It is quite remarkable that for large λ values and for c = 1.0
[panels (b) and (d)] the number of vaccinated individuals
vanishes and the values of 〈R〉 goes close to one in a
similar way as in the original network (without vaccination).
Obviously, as the vaccine cost c increases, the solution 〈R〉  1
spans across a larger interval of λ values so that for large
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Epidemic 〈R〉(λ) (top panels) and vacci-
nation 〈NV 〉(λ) (bottom panels) diagrams for ER and SF networks
(N = 104, 〈k〉 = 6) when the vaccine is not perfect (γ = 0.12). The
cost associated to the vaccine are c = 0.5 (left panels) and c = 1.0
(right panels). The imperfection of the vaccine causes two crossovers,
one for 〈R〉 and the other one for 〈NV 〉, between the performance of
SF networks and ER graphs.
enough c there is no vaccinated individual in the population
and one finally recovers the typical 〈R〉(λ) diagram of Fig. 2(a).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have analyzed the evolution of voluntary
vaccination in networked populations. At variance with classi-
cal approaches we have considered an evolutionary framework
so that individuals facing the vaccination dilemma do not
take the most rational strategy by considering the benefits
associated to each choice. On the contrary, they are considered
as replicating agents that imitate the strategies based on
their previous experience. To this aim we have entangled
the spreading dynamics of an influenza-like disease with
an evolutionary framework taking place at the end of each
season. Our results show that when vaccine is perfect (so
that vaccinated individuals do not get infected) scale-free
networks enhance both the vaccination behavior and the
effective immunization of the population as compared with
random graphs with homogeneous connectivity patterns.
By considering vaccine imperfection we obtain two re-
markable results. First, we have shown that, for scale-free
networks and low vaccine costs, there is a threshold value for
the vaccine imperfection so that, for values lower than this
threshold, vaccination behavior spans across the population,
and it is possible to suppress the disease for all the infection
probabilities. Instead, when vaccine imperfection becomes
large, agents are less prone to take it, and the disease takes
advantage of this risky behavior to spread more efficiently
across the population.
The other interesting result concerns the comparison be-
tween scale-free and homogeneous networks. We have shown
that when imperfection appears the better performance of
scale-free network is broken and there is a crossover effect so
that the number of infected (vaccinated) individuals increases
(decreases) with respect to homogeneous networks when λ is
large enough. This crossover results from the competition of
two well-known dynamical properties of scale-free networks:
the fast propagation of diseases and the promotion of coop-
erative behaviors. Thus, the ability of scale-free networks in
promoting cooperative behaviors (here represented as paying
the cost of taking vaccine) is threatened when payoffs are
dependent on a related dynamical process (here the spreading
of a disease) whose evolution is also affected (here enhanced)
by the heterogeneity of the network.
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